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STRIKES AND COURTS OF EQUITY.
Since the first appearance in this country of the injunction
as a means of restraining the acts of employes on strike,'
many articles have appeared for and against this development
of the equitable powers of the court.2 By the decision in the
I The earliest case is perhaps that of New York, Lake Erie and Western
Ry. Co. v. Wagner, I7 Wk. Law Bul. (Ohio), 5o6 (1887). The first three
cases of importance.were Sherry v.Perkins, 147 Mass. 212 (i888); Casey
v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, No. 3, 45 Fed. 135 (89),

and

the Coeur d'Alene Consolidation and Mining Co. v. Miners' Union of
Wardner, 5I Fed. 260 (1892).
2 In the LAw RtMISTER two articles have appeared defending the position taken by the courts, "The Legal Side of the Strike Question," by
Ardemus Stewart, 33 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 609 (1894), and an address
by Hon. William H. Taft on "Recent Criticism of the Federal Judiciary,"
34 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 576, pp. 6o5-6io (1895). The late Mr. Richard
C. McMurtrie attacked the position of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Edenbrecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U. S. (890) 3r, "1Equity
Jurisdiction Applied to Crimes and Misdemeanors," 31 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) p. I (1892), while the present writer has expressed some reasons
against the exercise of the power claimed by the courts in a series of articles: "Injunctions to Restrain Libels and Courts of Criminal Equity,"
31 Ib, 782 (1892); "The Courts and Striking Railroad Employes-The
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Debs Case, however, the question was closed as far as the
Federal Courts are concerned. Indeed, we might almost
say, that there is not a state court where the right to issue
an injunction restraining an act, though- the act was at the
same time a crime, could be successfully questioned. So
settled has become the practice of issuing these injunctions
that even the labor unions themselves have ceased to contest
their legality in the courts. In the case of Vegc/alerv. Gunter,'
in Massachusetts, the counsel for the strikers did not object to
an injunction restraining them from violence and intimidation,
but to the court's so wording the injunction that they could not
keep two strikers at the door of the complainants' mill to state
their side of the case to the complainants' employes, as the
employes went to or came from work.
The courts still say that these injunctions are not criminal
proceedings, yet the language of the opinions indicates very'
clearly their essentially criminal nature. Thus since, In re
Debs, in the case of Mackall v. Ratchford,2 striking miners
were convicted by the Federal Court of contempt of an
injunction restraining them from "in anywise interfering with
the management, operation, and conduct of the complainants'
mines, by menace, threats or intimidation." "If," says Judge
Goff, "the defendants prevented the employes of the mine from
going to or from their work, by interfering with them,
they are guilty of the contempt charged, and should, must
be, and will be punished." And again. " Was that influence
to be exerted, and was it exerted in a lawful and proper
manner? The answer to that question determines the guilt
Ann Arbor Cases," 32 Ib. 4S1 (1893) ; "A Protest Against Administering
Criminal Law by Injunction-The Debs Case," 3.cIb. 887 (1894) ; "Injunctions to Keep Men at Work," 3 Ib. Si (1894). Two articles are published in the reports of the Amerian Bar Association, one by W. M.
Rose, "The Law of Trusts and Strikes," which only refers to the subject
(vol. xvi, p. 287 (1893) ), the other by Charles C. Allen, "Injunctions and
Organized Labor," which is strongly opposed to the jurisdiction, (vol.
xvii, p. 299 (1894) ), republished in the American Law Review, (vol.
Xxviii,) 828. See, also, a note " On Government by Injunction" in 29
American Law Review, 282 (ISS5).
' 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
2 82 Fed. 41 (1897).
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or innocence of the accused." Another thought which also
runs through this case, as through most of the injunction
cases, is the same as that which influenced the decision in the
Debs Case: "Why should not a court of equity aid the executive ?" The illustration is used of a parade blocking a business
thoroughfare. " . . . if such parades were not prevented by
the city authorities, the owners of property so affected would
be entitled to the aid of the courts in protecting their rights."
The so-called "injunction law" has entered on a second
stage of its development. The first cases primarily deal with
the question whether courts of equity will interfere to prevent
certain threatened harms to property, though the acts contemplated may amount to a crime. This having been decided
in the affirmative, the courts now discuss what acts resulting
in harm they will restrain. For it must be admitted that it is
not the policy of the law to prevent one man from doing all
acts which may harm his neighbor. By advertising that I
have the best china for the lowest prices I may ruin my neighbor, but this ruin is regarded with indifference by the law.
Public policy, in this case, regards the benefits to be derived
from free competition, or rather, free struggle for life, as greater
than the evil of my neighbor's harm. The law must draw the
line between that harm which a man may, and that which he may
not do.' In the struggle between organized labor and organized capital, this line is only partly marked out. It is evidently
going to be the mission of these injunction proceedings to
mark it more plainly. Indeed, as we indicated, they have even
now begun the work, with what wisdom it remains for time to
show.
It is, of course, without question, that no one has a right
to injure the property of another by violence, or to attack his
laborers, or to threaten to do these things.2 Thus in Missouri, a
body of strikers cannot loiter near their former place of em'See, for a further exposition of this point, Judge Holmes' opinion in
Vegelaher v. Gunter, supra.
2 Davis z,.
Zimmerman, 36 N. Y. Suppi. 303 (1895). Such acts subject
the actor to a criminal indictment: R. v. Rowlands, 5 Cox C. C. 436
(1851).
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ployment, because this tends to put the workers in bodily fear.1
For the same reason, the Federal Courts prevented the
marching and countermarching of strikers on the public road
2
leading to a mine.
The question of picketing has given more trouble, but the
drift of authority is that it is an illegal method of inflicting
harm on employers. The reason for the opinion seems to be
the same as in the case of" marching," it tends to create unlawful intimidation.3 Displaying banners in which all persons
are warned to keep away from a certain shop has been held to
overstep the mark of legitimate harm, though here too, the
court considered the banners part of an organized scheme of
intimidation.' The boycott has also been considered an illegal
weapon?3 One of the express grounds for these boycott de'Shoe Company z'. Laxy, 131 M o. 2r2 (r895).
Mackall v. Ratchford, 82 Fed. 4 r (r897).
Vegelaher v. Gunter, 44 N. R. 1077 (1896).
They have no right
at least to use insulting language : Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. 595 (1893).
If accompanied by threats, the picketing is criminal : R. v. Druitt, io Cox
C. C. 592 (1867). See Lyons v. Wilkins [1896], I Ch. Si, for latest
English case; also mentioned infra.
4 Sherry z'. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212 (rS8).
Oxby v. Coopers' International Union, 72 Fed. 695 (t896); Casey
v. Typographical Union, 45 Fed. 135 (I891).
A boycott was held a criminal conspiracy in State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46 (1886) ; State v. Stewart,
39 Vt. 273 (1887) ; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1888) ; People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 40.3 (r886); People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep.
429 (1886) ; Baughman v. Askew, ii Va. L.J. 196(1887); Com. v. Shelton,
ii Va. L. J. 324 (1887); Cramp v. Com., 84 Va. 927 (i888).
But see,
contra, the decision of Shaw, C. J., in Com. v. Hunt, 4 Metc. iii (Mass.
1842), pp. 129, 13o. This opinion of the first American magistrate should
be read. Whether we agree with it or not, it is an opinion marked by
great ability.
In Old Dominion Steamship Company v. McKenna, 30 Fed. -48
(1887), the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York held a
boycott to be a civil wrong for which damages could be recovered. Indeed, in this case the court went much farther, and held the members of
the union liable in that they procured the plaintiff's workmen to quit
work in a body. In State v. Donaldson, 32 N.J. L. 151 (1867), a combination to produce a strike was held an indictable conspiracy. A boycott
on interstate freight by the employes of a railroad company is, of course,
illegal, but this is on the ground that their master, the common carrier,
is obliged to handle such freight: Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pennsvlvania Co., 54 Fed. 730 (893).
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cisions is that a combination to do an act may be unlawful,.
though the act done by the individual is lawful, because, unless
the act is done by many in combination, it will not be hurtful. Judge Harlan, in Arthur v. Oakes,' has expressed this
idea when he says, " A combination of two or more persons,
with such intent (the intent to cripple a road), and under such
circumstances that give them, when so combined, a power to
do an injury they would not possess as individuals, acting
singly, has always been recognized as in itself wrongful and
illegal."2
The strike itself, or the combination of all of a man's employes to quit work in a body, in order to compel acquiescence
in their demands, was declared illegal by Judge Jenkins, in the
case of Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Northern Pacific
Railway Company.3 The case was reversed,4 but one can
hardly say that the question is settled. It is worth noting that
Chief Justice Shaw thought a strike on the part of those engaged for a definite period of employment illegal,' though he
would have been very much surprised to be asked to issue
an injunction restraining such a strike. It is admitted that
I ir C. C. A. 209; 62 Fed. 321(1S94).
2 Two

cases are cited by Judge Harlan to support his proposition : Cal-

lan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1887), and Com. v. Hunt, 4 Metc. i i i (Mass.
1842). The first case is one arising out of a boycott of a musician by a
musical labor union. The conviction was had in the police court of the
District of Columbia without a trial by jury, and the Supreme Court set
aside the verdict as in conflict with that provision of the Constitution of
the United States providing for trial by jury. The second case is the one
in which Chief Justice Shaw decided that a boycott was not necessarily
criminal. The case was probably cited by Chief Justice Harlan for the
expression, page 131 : "If a large number of men engaged for a certain
time should combine together to violate their contract, and quit their
employment together, it would present a very different question."
3 6o Fed. 8o3 (1894.)
See, also, a strike considered as a criminal
conspiracy: State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151 (1867).
'Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310 (894) ; but see Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. 48 (1887). Elder v. Whitesides, 72 Fed. 724
(1896), is probably an authority contra to Arthur v. Oakes; but it is so
reported that the facts on which the injunction was issued are not clear.
See, however, Burdell v. Hogan, 54 Fed. 40 (0893).
5 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. (Mass.) Il (1842).
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one cannot remain an employe and combine to refuse to
work. '
Because the writer is opposed to the use of the injunction,
in many, if not all of the above instances, it by no means follows that he is opposed to the substantive rules of law expressed in them. In the struggle between the class that has
labor to sell, and the class that has property with which to buy
labor, there are to the contestants things which the law should
allow, and things which it should not allow. It is proper that
a line should be drawn, and infinitely better that it should be
drawn by the courts in their attempt to do right in each individual case, than that the law should grow up by direct
legislative enactment. The objection is not to the substantive
law, but to the machinery and tribunal that enforces it.
Even here, however, it is proper to draw a distinction. Many
acts expose a man to civil liability which do not lay him open
to a criminal prosecution. It may well be, though it is not a
necessary inference, that in this struggle between capital and
labor, there are acts which should expose the actor to a civil,
I Toledo A. A. & N. Ry. Co. v. Penn. Co., 54 Fed. 730 (1883), lb. 746
(1893) ; Southern California Ry. Co. v. Rutherford, 62 Fed. 796 (1894).
We have not discussed the English cases in the text. The first English
case, where an injunction was granted against strikers, is that of Spinning
Company v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551 (1868), in which the strikers were
restrained from printing or publishing any placards or advertisements
stating that all "well wishers" to the Operative Cotton Spinning Association should not cause any trouble or annoyance to the Spring Head
Spinning Company by knocking at the door of their office until the dispute between them and the self-acting minders was finally terminated.
See, also, Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 488 (I369), and Rollins v. Hinks,
L. R. 13 Eq. 355 (87!).
These cases were overruled in Assurance Company v. Knott, Io Ch. App. 142 (1874). See, also, Temperton v. Russell,
i Q. B. 435, 438 (1893). Under a section of the present Judiciary
Act, 36 and 37 Vict., ch. 66, sec. 25 and sub-section 8, the English courts
have the right to issue injunctions against one threatening a trespass without claim of legal right. The courts have interpreted this Act as giving
them power to restrain one man from persuading another to break his
contract with a third person, when the object of such persuasion is the
malicious injury to the third person : Mogul v. 'McGregor, A. C. 25 (1892) ;
Teniperton v. Russell, I Q. B. 715 (1893); Lyons v. Wilkins, I Chanc.
8ri; but see the remarks of Lord Escher in Flood v. Jackson, 2 Q. B.
38 (1895), where he said that the only recognized tribunal that could
decide whether the act is or is not malicious is a jury.
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but not a criminal, liability.' Thus, the strike itself may possibly be considered a civil tort, but not a criminal conspiracy.
In such cases, the objection usually urged against the injunction would not hold. The protest is against the use of the injunction where the act restrained is unquestionably a crime,
viz., the injunction which restrains violence, or threats of
violence to person or property. While objecting to the injunction in such cases, we admit that it is settled law, that the
injunction may issue.
The fact that the law on this point is settled, as far as the
courts are concerned, cuts off one class of argument, which
heretofore has been urged against the use of the injunction,
namely, that it is contrary to settled principles of equityjurisdiction. The battle must now be fought out at the polls and before legislatures. In such forum it is not a good reason for
changing what the judiciary, after deliberation, have decided,
to say that they have made a new departure. We must go
further, and show that the new departure is contrary to public
policy. It is also incumbent on the advocates of the injunction to do something more than show a line of ancient legal
precedents to support the new development. The argument
that equity will always protect property is as futile as the argument on the other side that heretofore the limit of equitable
jurisdiction has been the restraint of nuisances. When the
right rule for courts to follow becomes a political and
legislative question, the only arguments worth considering
are those which deal with principles of public expediency.
The court, in Davis v. Zimmerman,' indicated the real ground
on which the use of the injunction must now be supported
when it said, "It is better for employers and employes, and for
the peace and safety of the state, that such relief be exercised
by the -courts, where parties can be heard, than to permit such
violations of the law to go unrestrained, until force is arrayed
against force, and the strong arm of the executive is compelled
1 If the reader will look over the foregoing notes, however, he will see

that in every case where an injunction has been issued the criminal
courts had previously upheld indictments for similar acts.
236 N. Y. Suppl. 303 (1895).
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to intervene with troops to prevent disorder and destruction of
property."
It is not my object to point out all the reasons why we
should not employ the injunction to restrain an act which is a
crime. As the question presents itself there would seem to be
no need. The issuing of the injunction in such a case, coupled
with the fact that violations may be tried by a court without a
jury, is in direct conflict with a principle, or public policy,
vital to the well being of any people. This principle is that
no citizen shall be accused of criminal acts, or have the fact of
his having committed a criminal act determined, by anyone
connected with, or selected by, the government. The words
" criminal act," as here used, do not, I think, mean every act
which subjects a man to an action by the state. There may be
acts which the law calls criminal, but which do not hold the
actor up to the odium of his fellows. It is true that prosecutions for such acts must be tried by jury under our present
law, but a modification of our law in this respect would not lay
us open to the charge of having lost part of our heritage of
liberty. So the jury system, as we know it, might be radically
altered, a majority vote might decide in criminal cases, one
jury might try all the cases occurring for a much longer time
than at present, the grand jury might try as well as accuse,
the number of jurymen might be greatly increased or diminished, and yet the fundamental principle above set forth remain
unshaken. There is no peculiar sacredness in our present jury
system, but the principle on which it rests is one of the master
keys to human freedom.
The reasons for our rule of public policy are plain, and
have appealed to us for many generations as sound. It is no
light thing for a private individual to accuse a man of crime,
but when one in an official position makes the accusation, it
carries in the minds of his neighbors half the weight of formal
conviction. You ought not to accuse a man of imagining evil.
That was the trouble with the old law of treason. The overt
act alone is what is regarded in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. Now the mere issuing of the injunction is such an
accusation. When a judge says in a written order: " You
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must refrain from destroying the property of A. B., or from
beating his servants," the judge asserts his belief that you are
about to do these things.
Again, under all civilized systems of law, the judge and the
the executive officer are different persons. Why? There
are three reasons.
First: Because the man who makes the executive order
should not be the one to weigh the question of his right to
issue it. He cannot do so impartially.
Second: Because no one can properly try another who is acaccused of breaking his own personal order. When you are
are accused before a juryof destroying A. B.'s property, you are
tried for violating a well recognized law of society, not for violating the personal order of the men who try you. Judges are
but human. Have you committed a crime? This is an abstract
question. But it is different when a personal order of the judge
has been treated with contempt. In one contempt case the
judge complains: "A striking miner said, ' I will eat mine
(the injunction) for breakfast.'" Such expressions as these
concerning one's orders are not calculated to put one in a
proper frame of mind to try the fact as to whether a particular
person has violated the order.' Indeed, if there is any doubt
of the truth of the proposition that a man should not try
violations of his own orders, reading the contempt cases would
expel that doubt. No one can read these cases without
realizing that the judge is upholding not what he believes to
be the law, but his own personal order.
Third: The community must believe the judiciary are impartial. This implicit trust, and the consequent position of
the judiciary which enables them to compel obedience without
I Mackall v. Ratchford, 82 Fed. 4r, p. 44. I do not want to be understood as saying that Judge Goff was unfair in this case. There seems to
have been no question that the accused had violated the injunction.
I simply wish to indicate that it is evident that the learned judge, through
no fault of his, unless he was at fault in being human, was in no judicial
frame of mind to enable him to try the fact whether the persons before
him had or had not violated his order: Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. z. Baily,
61 Fed. 494 (1893) ; Lacos v,Toledo P. & W. R. R., 7 Biss. U. S. C. C.
513 (1887) ; King v. Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co., 7 Biss. 529 (1887); United

States v. Kane, 23 Fed. 748 (1885).

STRIKES AND

COURTS OF EQUITY.

force, is one of the tests of advanced civilization, as it is the
best guarantee for civil order. Such a trust is impossible, and,
we believe, properly impossible, where the judge tries not
violations of law, but violations of his personal order.
The reply which is made to this line of argument by those
who, like Mr. Justice Brewer in the Debs case,' have so far
used any argument other than the technical one that equity
will protect property, is that the injunction proceedings accomplish the object for which they are issued; that violence is
stopped; that the strike is put to an end too. He points to the
testimony of one'of the strikers in that case: " It was not the
soldiers that ended the strike. It was not the old brotherhoods that ended the strike. It was simply the United States
courts that ended the strike." And this may be admitted.
But at what cost? At a cost of a part of that respect for the
court which is the rich product of our civilization, and which
is the very force which makes these injunctions a success at
the present time. One cannot come in contact with the class
adversely affected by these orders without at once perceiving
that we are rapidly undermining one of the props of that
social oraer which is necessary for the continuation of any
civilization.
The argument which we quoted from the New York case,
however, contains a valuable suggestion. It is there pointed
out that the injunction warns the contestants in a capital and
labor struggle when the)' are about to go too far, and that
this warning prevents violation of the law.

In many cases

this is so, and if legislation should ever, as we hope it will,
abolish the injunction as at present used, an effort should be
made to retain this feature.
There is no use warning a man not to do personal violence
to another, or not to shake his fist in another's face. He knows
these acts are illegal. When a reminder is necessary it can
be given by the executive. But it is found that there are
many acts which strikers often think they have a right to do,
and which they would not believe any one but a judge that
they have not a r;ght to do, but which acts produce fear of
158 U. S. 564 (IS95).
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bodily harm in the minds of their antagonists and are illegal.
The case of Mfwkall v. Ratclford1 is a good illustration of
this. The strikers honestly thought they had a right to march
and counter-march on a public road in front of the mines.
They did not intend violence, and there was no violence.
But their marching put the non-striking miners in fear of
bodily harm. It was something which the strikers had no
right to do, and which their persistence in after the warning
might well be considered a crime. In such cases, and they
are numerous, the injunction, which is not really an injunction
but a warning, has great uses. An alleged violation, however, should be tried by a jury before a judge other than the
one issuing the order.
On the other hand, I cannot agree that it would remedy the
present evil to say simply that all violations of injunctions
should be tried by a jury. In the first place, where the act
enjoined is unquestionably a crime, recognized as such by all
the community, the grand jury and not a judge is the proper
body to make the accusation. In the second place, the old
contempt cases are not fitted for jury proceedings. These are
the cases where the defendant by doing what he does under a
claim of right in property, as cutting down trees because he
claims to own the land, has done something which puts his
legal title to a test. The plaintiff has brought him into court.
The defendant has offered legal battle, and by so doing
rendered himself with respect to the property in dispute,
subject in a peculiar way to the court's orders.
The
court ought to have a summary jurisdiction to enforce these
orders.
We have said that we hope legislation will wipe out the conte npt cases in criminal matters. At the same time we cannot
but recognize that this phase of the extension of judicial power
is but one of the many in which the judge evinces his unconscious belief that the work of the other department of government must be done by him, as well as the work of judging.
The reason for this attitude is not far to seek. It lies in the
dry rot which has attacked our state executives and our state

182

Fed. 41 (I897).
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legislatures, which renders them unable to perform in anything
like an efficient manner their proper functions.
William DraperLewis.
NorE.-Since the above was in type, the January number of the

Virginia Law Register has come to hand, containing an article by
Mr. S. S. P. Patteson on "Government by Injunction." From
this article I see (I quote from Mr. Patteson) that "in the State
of Kansas a statute has already been passed entitled 'An Act to
establish trial by jury in cases of contempt of court and restricting
the power of judges and courts in contempt proceedings.' Section
5 of the Kansas Law, which went into effect May 8, 1897, is as
follows: 'The testimony taken on the trial of any accusation for
contempt shall be preserved, and any judgment of conviction
therefor may be reviewed upon direct appeal to, or by writ of error
from the Supreme Court, and affirmed, reviewed, or modified as
justice may require. Upon allowance of an appeal or writ of
error, execution of the judgment shall be stayed upon the giving of
such bond as may be required by the court or judge thereof, or by
any justice of the Supreme Court.'
(18th Session Laws of Kansas,
1897, p. 205.)
" By it the offence is divided into two classes: contempts committed in the presence of the court, and contempts not committed

in the presence of the court. The law as to the former is left
untouched, but as to the latter the power of the court is so hampered as to be almost destroyed. Summary punishment or restraint
of liberty upon exparte affidavits is abolished. The officer must
return the process and show that it has been disobeyed ; then an

attachment may issue and the person be arrested and brought before
the court. When this is done a written accusation must be filed,
in the nature of an indictment, which the accused is required to
answer at a time and place fixed by the order of the court; and, if
the accused answers, the trial proceeds, as in criminal cases, where
the accused is confronted by the witness in the presence of a jury.
He has also a right of appeal. The right of appeal destroys the
jurisdiction of the court in that state, because it takes away from it
the power to use force at the time it may be necessary to put down
a mob or strike by that means."

